Vulnerable Components in Adonisjs with Dynamodb

AdonisJS encourages rapid development with its ORM-like Lucid models, but integrating with low-level services such as AWS DynamoDB can reintroduce common API and data-layer risks. When AdonisJS controllers directly proxy user input into DynamoDB operations without validation, authorization, and schema checks, the application exposes functionality that maps to BOLA/IDOR, BFLA/Privilege Escalation, and Unsafe Consumption findings.

Consider a typical pattern where a route like /api/users/:id/profile reads a DynamoDB item using a user-provided identifier. If the identifier is taken directly from request parameters and used as the DynamoDB key without verifying that the authenticated user owns that item, the endpoint becomes vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Attackers can enumerate identifiers and access other users’ profiles, which middleBrick flags as a BOLA/IDOR finding with severity High.

DynamoDB’s attribute-based access control (ABAC) and condition expressions are powerful, but developers using AdonisJS may omit necessary condition checks in Update or Delete operations. For example, allowing a PATCH request to modify an item without ensuring the requester’s role or tenant matches the item’s ownership attribute can lead to Privilege Escalation. middleBrick’s BFLA/Privilege Escalation checks detect cases where update or delete actions lack proper ownership or role validation, even when DynamoDB’s conditional writes are available but not enforced.

Unsafe Consumption is another concern when AdonisJS passes raw request bodies directly into DynamoDB UpdateExpression or PutItem calls. Without strict input validation and type coercion, clients can inject unexpected attribute names, numeric strings, or nested structures that cause write failures or data corruption. DynamoDB’s schemaless nature means invalid or malicious payloads may be stored in unexpected forms, increasing exposure of Data Exposure findings if sensitive attributes are returned inadvertently. middleBrick’s Property Authorization and Input Validation checks highlight missing allowlists for attribute paths and unsafe reflection of user data in responses.

LLM/AI Security is relevant when AdonisJS endpoints expose data that feeds into AI features, such as generating summaries from user data stored in DynamoDB. middleBrick’s LLM/AI checks look for System Prompt Leakage and Output Scanning, ensuring that cached or retrieved DynamoDB content does not leak prompts or return API keys and PII in model responses. Unauthenticated LLM endpoint detection also flags DynamoDB-backed completions that are reachable without proper session or token validation.

Inventory Management and Rate Limiting checks highlight missing controls around request volume and resource enumeration. If AdonisJS does not enforce per-user rate limits on DynamoDB-heavy endpoints, clients can probe identifiers or exhaust provisioned capacity, increasing the likelihood of discovery and denial-of-service patterns. middleBrick scans for missing rate limiting and excessive agency patterns, such as unbounded loops over DynamoDB query results, which can indicate inefficient or risky consumption.

Remediation centers on strict ownership checks, typed input validation, and conditional write enforcement. Below are concrete, working examples for AdonisJS that align with DynamoDB best practices and address findings detected by middleBrick.

Secure Read with Ownership Check

Ensure that every DynamoDB GetItem or Query includes a condition that the authenticated user owns the target item. Use environment-based user IDs and avoid trusting route parameters alone.

import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'
import { DynamoDBClient, GetItemCommand } from '@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb'
import { marshall, unmarshall } from '@aws-sdk/util-dynamodb'

export default class ProfilesController {
  private readonly client = new DynamoDBClient({})

  public async show({ params, auth }: HttpContextContract) {
    const userId = auth.user?.id
    const targetId = params.id

    if (!userId || userId !== targetId) {
      throw new Error('Unauthorized: profile access denied')
    }

    const command = new GetItemCommand({
      TableName: process.env.DYNAMO_TABLE_USERS!,
      Key: marshall({ id: targetId }),
      ConsistentRead: true,
    })

    const { Item } = await this.client.send(command)
    if (!Item) {
      throw new Error('Not found')
    }

    return unmarshall(Item)
  }
}

Secure Update with Conditional Writes and Ownership

Use ConditionExpression to enforce ownership and prevent privilege escalation. Validate and allowlist fields before constructing UpdateExpression.

import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/core/HttpContext'
import { DynamoDBClient, UpdateItemCommand } from '@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb'
import { marshall, unmarshall } from '@aws-sdk/util-dynamodb'

export default class ProfilesController {
  private readonly client = new DynamoDBClient({})

  public async update({ params, request, auth }: HttpContextContract) {
    const userId = auth.user?.id
    const targetId = params.id
    const body = request.only(['bio', 'theme'])

    if (!userId || userId !== targetId) {
      throw new Error('Unauthorized: update denied')
    }

    const allowed: string[] = ['bio', 'theme']
    const updateExpressions: string[] = []
    const expressionAttributeValues: Record = {}

    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(body)) {
      if (!allowed.includes(key)) {
        continue // skip unsafe properties
      }
      updateExpressions.push(`#${key} = :${key}`)
      expressionAttributeValues[`:${key}`] = value
    }

    if (updateExpressions.length === 0) {
      throw new Error('No valid fields to update')
    }

    const command = new UpdateItemCommand({
      TableName: process.env.DYNAMO_TABLE_USERS!,
      Key: marshall({ id: targetId }),
      ConditionExpression: 'userId = :userId',
      ExpressionAttributeNames: { '#bio': 'bio', '#theme': 'theme' },
      ExpressionAttributeValues: {
        ':userId': { S: userId },
        ...marshall(expressionAttributeValues),
      },
      UpdateExpression: `SET ${updateExpressions.join(', ')}`,
    })

    await this.client.send(command)
    return { message: 'updated' }
  }
}

Input Validation and Allowlisting

Use schema validation (e.g., AdonisJS schema or a library like Joi) before constructing DynamoDB expressions. Reject unexpected keys to prevent Unsafe Consumption and Data Exposure issues.

import { schema } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/Validator'
import { validate } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/Validator/Validator'

const profileSchema = schema.create({
  bio: schema.string.optional(),
  theme: schema.enum(['light', 'dark']).optional(),
})

export async function validateProfilePayload(ctx: HttpContextContract) {
  await validate({
    schema: profileSchema,
    data: ctx.request.body(),
    messages: {
      'enum.theme': 'Theme must be either "light" or "dark"',
    },
  })
}

Rate Limiting and Inventory Management

Apply per-user rate limits on endpoints that query or mutate DynamoDB resources. This reduces probing risk and aligns with middleBrick’s Rate Limiting findings.

import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'
import { RateLimiterMemory } from 'rate-limiter-flexible'

const limiter = new RateLimiterMemory({
  points: 100, // 100 requests
  duration: 60, // per 60 seconds
})

export async function rateLimit(ctx: HttpContextContract, next: () => Promise) {
  try {
    await limiter.consume(ctx.auth.user?.id || ctx.request.ip)
    await next()
  } catch {
    ctx.response.status(429).send({ error: 'Too many requests' })
  }
}