Pii Leakage in Buffalo with Basic Auth
Pii Leakage in Buffalo with Basic Auth — how this specific combination creates or exposes the vulnerability
Buffalo is a popular Go web framework that simplifies routing, parameter parsing, and response rendering. When Basic Auth is used in Buffalo without additional protections, PII leakage can occur because credentials are transmitted in an easily decoded format and may be inadvertently exposed in logs, error messages, or downstream outputs.
Basic Auth encodes credentials using Base64, which is reversible and provides no encryption. If a Buffalo application sends credentials only via Basic Auth over non-TLS transport, an on-path attacker can decode the header and obtain usernames and passwords. Even over TLS, improper handling of credentials in Buffalo handlers or middleware can lead to PII leakage through server logs, panic traces, or debug output.
Consider a Buffalo action that retrieves a user profile and includes the authenticated username in a JSON response without careful filtering:
app.Get("/profile", func(c buffalo.Context) error {
user, _ := c.Value(&models.User{}).(*models.User)
// Risk: including raw user fields that may contain PII
return c.Render(200, r.JSON(user))
})
If the User model contains fields such as Email, PhoneNumber, or NationalID, and no explicit field filtering is applied, the response can leak PII. MiddleBrick’s LLM/AI Security checks include Output scanning for PII and would flag exposed email or phone values in API responses, which is relevant when Buffalo APIs are consumed by AI-enabled clients.
Another scenario involves error handling. Buffalo’s default HTML or JSON error rendering might include request parameters that contain PII. For example:
app.Params.Add("email", "user@example.com")
app.Params.Add("ssn", "123-45-6789")
// Risk: parameters may appear in logs or error pages
app.Render(500, r.HTML("errors/internal", buffalo.X{"params": c.Params()}))
Here, sensitive parameters could be logged in plaintext by application or server logging middleware, leading to PII leakage. middleBrick’s Data Exposure checks are designed to detect such risky outputs and to map findings to frameworks like OWASP API Top 10 and GDPR.
When combined with unauthenticated scanning, which is a default mode in middleBrick, these exposures can be identified without credentials. middleBrick’s cross-referencing of OpenAPI specs with runtime findings helps highlight endpoints where PII-bearing parameters are returned without proper authorization controls.
Basic Auth-Specific Remediation in Buffalo — concrete code fixes
To reduce PII leakage risk in Buffalo applications using Basic Auth, enforce transport security, avoid logging credentials, and apply strict output filtering.
1. Enforce TLS and avoid sending credentials in plaintext
Always serve Buffalo applications over HTTPS. Use middleware to redirect HTTP to HTTPS and ensure the Authorization header is never logged.
// main.go
package app
import (
"github.com/gobuffalo/buffalo"
"github.com/gobuffalo/buffalo/middleware"
"github.com/gobuffalo/packr/v2"
)
func App() *buffalo.App {
if Env() == buffalo.EnvProd {
app := buffalo.New(buffalo.Options{
PreWares: []buffalo.PreWare{
middleware.ForceSSL,
},
})
return app
}
// local development without forced SSL
app := buffalo.New(buffalo.Options{})
return app
}
2. Securely handle Basic Auth credentials
Use middleware to validate credentials without exposing them in logs. Avoid passing raw credentials into Buffalo context values that might be serialized.
// auth_middleware.go
package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"encoding/base64"
"strings"
)
func BasicAuth(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if auth == "" {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
const prefix = "Basic "
if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, prefix) {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
payload, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(auth[len(prefix):])
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
parts := strings.SplitN(string(payload), ":", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 || !valid(parts[0], parts[1]) {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Safe: store only a user identifier, not the password
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), "userID", parts[0])
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
}
}
func valid(user, pass string) bool {
// validate against a secure store
return user == "alice" && pass == "correct-hashed-password"
}
3. Filter PII in responses
Use explicit serialization to exclude sensitive fields. Do not rely on automatic struct serialization when returning user data.
// user_profiles.go
package actions
import (
"github.com/gobuffalo/buffalo"
"github.com/gobuffalo/validate/v3"
)
type SafeUser struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Role string `json:"role"`
// Email intentionally omitted to prevent PII leakage
}
app.Get("/profile", func(c buffalo.Context) error {
user := &models.User{}
if err := c.Value(user); err != nil {
return c.Render(400, r.JSON(buffalo.Error{Message: err.Error()}))
}
safe := SafeUser{
ID: user.ID,
Name: user.Name,
Role: user.Role,
}
return c.Render(200, r.JSON(safe))
})
4. Avoid leaking parameters in error pages and logs
Configure Buffalo to exclude sensitive parameters from logs and error payloads. Use custom error handlers that strip PII before rendering.
// error_handler.go
package actions
import (
"github.com/gobuffalo/buffalo"
)
func ErrorHandler(c buffalo.Context, err error) error {
// Log only non-sensitive metadata
c.Response().Header().Set("X-Error-Handled", "true")
// Render a generic error without parameters
return c.Render(500, r.JSON(map[string]string{"error": "internal server error"}))
}
5. Combine with middleBrick scans
Use the middleBrick CLI to validate that PII leakage is not present after remediation:
$ middlebrick scan https://api.example.com
The scan will report findings across 12 checks, including Data Exposure and LLM/AI Security, helping you confirm that PII is not exposed in API responses.
Related CWEs: dataExposure
| CWE ID | Name | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information | HIGH |
| CWE-209 | Error Information Disclosure | MEDIUM |
| CWE-213 | Exposure of Sensitive Information Due to Incompatible Policies | HIGH |
| CWE-215 | Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Debugging Code | MEDIUM |
| CWE-312 | Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information | HIGH |
| CWE-359 | Exposure of Private Personal Information (PII) | HIGH |
| CWE-522 | Insufficiently Protected Credentials | CRITICAL |
| CWE-532 | Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File | MEDIUM |
| CWE-538 | Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File | HIGH |
| CWE-540 | Inclusion of Sensitive Information in Source Code | HIGH |