Missing Authentication in Fiber with Cockroachdb

When a Fiber application connects directly to a CockroachDB cluster without enforcing authentication on incoming HTTP requests, it can expose database operations to unauthenticated callers. This typically occurs when route handlers construct SQL queries using values taken directly from the request without first verifying the caller’s identity or authorization. Because CockroachDB uses a PostgreSQL-wire protocol, connection strings and query parameters behave like standard Postgres examples, and missing middleware checks allow any unauthenticated request to reach database routines.

Consider a handler that selects user data based on an ID provided in the URL. If the handler trusts the ID without confirming the requester is allowed to view that resource, it becomes vulnerable to BOLA/IDOR at the API layer, while the underlying CockroachDB query runs with the privileges of the connected service account. An attacker can iterate through numeric or UUID identifiers and observe whether valid data is returned, effectively bypassing intended access controls.

Additionally, if the Fiber app uses a shared CockroachDB connection pool with broad permissions (for example, a cluster user with SELECT access across multiple tenant tables), unauthenticated endpoints can leak information that should be isolated per customer. This is especially risky when combined with verbose error messages returned by CockroachDB, which can disclose schema names or constraint details that aid further exploitation.

Middleware that validates tokens or session cookies before constructing queries is essential. Without it, even if CockroachDB itself is hardened, the API surface remains open. Security checks such as Authentication and BOLA/IDOR run in parallel during a middleBrick scan and would flag endpoints that accept database operations without prior verification.

Ensure every route that interacts with CockroachDB validates the caller before building queries. Below are concrete, syntactically correct examples using the Fiber framework with the pgx driver for CockroachDB.

1. JWT-based authentication guard

Use middleware to verify a JWT before allowing the request to proceed. This example decodes a token and attaches a user context to the request.

// main.go
package main

import (
    "context"
    "fmt"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2/middleware/jwt"
    "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)

func main() {
    app := fiber.New()

    pool, err := pgxpool.New("postgres://user:pass@localhost:26257/defaultdb?sslmode=require")
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    defer pool.Close()

    app.Use(jwt.New(jwt.Config{
        SigningKey: jwt.SigningKey{Key: []byte("your_jwt_secret")},
    }))

    app.Get("/users/:id", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
        user := c.Locals("user").(*jwt.Token)
        claims := user.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
        requesterID := claims["sub"].(string)

        targetID := c.Params("id")
        if requesterID != targetID {
            return c.Status(fiber.StatusForbidden).SendString("not allowed")
        }

        var email string
        err := pool.QueryRow(c.Context(), "SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = $1", targetID).Scan(&email)
        if err != nil {
            return c.Status(fiber.StatusInternalServerError).SendString("db error")
        }
        return c.JSON(fiber.Map{"email": email})
    })

    app.Listen(":3000")
}

2. Parameterized queries with explicit tenant scope

Always use placeholders to avoid injection and include tenant or user context in the WHERE clause to prevent cross-tenant reads even if authentication is bypassed elsewhere.

// handlers.go
package main

import (
    "context"
    "net/http"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
    "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)

func getUserHandler(pool *pgxpool.Pool) fiber.Handler {
    return func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
        user := c.Locals("user")
        if user == nil {
            return c.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized).SendString("missing auth")
        }
        claims := user.(jwt.MapClaims)
        tenantID := claims["tenant_id"].(string)

        var data string
        err := pool.QueryRow(c.Context(),
            "SELECT data FROM tenant_data WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND id = $2",
            tenantID, c.Params("dataid")).Scan(&data)
        if err != nil {
            return c.Status(http.StatusInternalServerError).SendString("query failed")
        }
        return c.JSON(fiber.Map{"data": data})
    }
}

3. Connection strings and TLS for CockroachDB

Ensure your connection pool enforces secure communication and does not rely on default certificates when deployed in production.

// db.go
package main

import (
    "context"
    "log"
    "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)

func newPool() (*pgxpool.Pool, error) {
    connURL := "postgres://myuser:mypassword@cockroachdb-host:26257/mydb?sslmode=verify-full"
    config, err := pgxpool.ParseConfig(connURL)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    config.ConnConfig.RuntimeParams = map[string]string{"application_name": "fiber-api"}
    pool, err := pgxpool.NewWithConfig(context.Background(), config)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    return pool, nil
}

By requiring authentication checks in Fiber handlers and using parameterized queries with tenant-aware WHERE clauses, you reduce the risk of unauthenticated data access against CockroachDB-backed services.