Missing Authentication in Echo Go with Dynamodb

When an Echo Go service interacts with DynamoDB without enforcing authentication, it exposes an unauthenticated attack surface that middleBrick scans as part of its Authentication check. In this scenario, API endpoints accept requests without validating an identity or an API key, and they directly construct DynamoDB API calls using values taken from the request, such as path parameters or headers. This creates a BOLA/IDOR condition because the caller can manipulate resource identifiers—such as a user ID in the URL—and the backend issues DynamoDB operations without confirming that the caller is authorized for that specific resource.

For example, an endpoint like /users/{userID} might build a GetItem request using the userID from the URL as the key, without first confirming the request includes a valid session token, an OAuth scope, or any other proof of authorization. Because the scan tests the unauthenticated attack surface, middleBrick can invoke the endpoint without credentials and observe whether it returns data or errors, thereby detecting Missing Authentication. If the endpoint returns a 200 with another user’s data, the finding is classified under Authentication and BOLA/IDOR, with remediation guidance to enforce per-request identity checks and to scope DynamoDB operations to the authenticated principal.

Additionally, missing authentication can amplify other checks such as Property Authorization and Data Exposure. Without an identity gate, callers can probe enumeration patterns via query parameters, and DynamoDB responses might inadvertently return sensitive attributes if the response processing does not filter fields per role. The scan’s parallel checks for Input Validation and Data Exposure help surface cases where unauthenticated input reaches DynamoDB and where responses contain excessive data. Remediation focuses on integrating authentication middleware in Echo Go, validating and authorizing every request before constructing AWS SDK calls, and applying least-privilege IAM policies to the DynamoDB actions the service performs.

To address Missing Authentication when using Echo Go with DynamoDB, implement request-level authentication and strict authorization before building any AWS SDK operation. Below are concrete, working code examples that show how to validate a token and scope DynamoDB calls to the requesting user in Go.

// main.go
package main

import (
	"context"
	"net/http"
	"os"

	"github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
	"github.com/labstack/echo/v4/middleware"
	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config"
	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/dynamodb"
	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/dynamodb/types"
)

func main() {
	e := echo.New()
	// Enforce authentication on all endpoints
	e.Use(middleware.JWTWithConfig(middleware.JWTConfig{
		SigningKey: []byte(os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET")),
		Claims:     &CustomClaims{},
	}))

	dbClient := dynamodb.NewFromConfig(*config.MustLoadDefaultConfig(context.TODO()))
	e.GET("/users/:userID", func(c echo.Context) error {
		caller := c.Get("user").(*CustomClaims)
		userID := c.Param("userID")

		// Scope the DynamoDB request to the authenticated user
		if caller.Subject != userID {
			return c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "access denied"})
		}

		resp, err := dbClient.GetItem(c.Request().Context(), &dynamodb.GetItemInput{
			TableName: aws.String(os.Getenv("TABLE_NAME")),
			Key: map[string]types.AttributeValue{
				"user_id": &types.AttributeValueMemberS{Value: userID},
			},
		})
		if err != nil {
			return c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": err.Error()})
		}
		if resp.Item == nil {
			return c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
		}
		return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp.Item)
	})

	_ = e.Start(":8080")
}

type CustomClaims struct {
	Subject string `json:"sub"`
}

This example uses JWT-based authentication in Echo, ensuring that every request includes a valid token before proceeding. The handler extracts the caller’s subject and compares it to the :userID path parameter to enforce ownership, thereby mitigating BOLA/IDOR. Only after this check does it construct a GetItem input with a key scoped to the authenticated user, ensuring DynamoDB operations respect authorization boundaries.

For broader protection across many endpoints, the Pro plan’s continuous monitoring can detect when any endpoint in your API lacks authentication controls. Its dashboard and GitHub Action integration allow you to fail builds if a route interacts with DynamoDB without verified identity checks, helping you catch regressions before deployment. Similarly, the MCP Server lets you scan API definitions and implementations directly from your IDE, so you can validate that every DynamoDB call is preceded by proper authentication logic.