Man In The Middle in Chi with Cockroachdb

When a Chi application connects to Cockroachdb without enforcing strict transport protections, a Man In The Middle (MitM) can intercept or alter traffic between the client and the distributed SQL nodes. In Chi, this typically occurs when TLS is optional, misconfigured, or when connection strings are built dynamically without enforcing encryption. Cockroachdb supports TLS with client certificates, server certificates, and strict verification; omitting these allows an attacker on the same network or path to perform session hijacking, credential theft, or query tampering.

Chi routes often open multiple database connections across services. If any route initializes a Cockroachdb client with sslmode=disable or uses a non-validated certificate, the confidentiality and integrity guarantees of the database layer are weakened. An attacker who can position themselves between the application pod and the Cockroachdb cluster can replay or modify SQL statements, escalating issues detected by the middleBrick security scanner under Data Exposure and Encryption checks. middleBrick identifies missing encryption or weak certificate validation during its unauthenticated scan, flagging these patterns as high-risk findings with remediation guidance.

Additionally, service discovery mechanisms in Kubernetes can expose Cockroachdb endpoints over plain HTTP if Ingress or Service definitions lack proper TLS termination. middleBrick’s OpenAPI/Swagger analysis cross-references runtime behavior with spec definitions, detecting unauthenticated LLM endpoints only when AI-specific endpoints are exposed, but for SQL traffic it focuses on Encryption and Data Exposure categories. Without mutual TLS and strict certificate pinning, queries from Chi handlers can be intercepted, leading to data exfiltration or injection of malicious SQL fragments.

Secure your Chi application by enforcing TLS with verified certificates for every Cockroachdb connection. Use a static connection string with sslmode=verify-full and provide CA, client certificate, and client key files. This ensures the server identity is validated and the channel is encrypted, mitigating MitM risks.

// Secure Cockroachdb connection in Chi using pgx with TLS
package main

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/tls"
	"crypto/x509"
	"io/ioutil"
	"log"
	"net/http"

	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)

func main() {
	// Load CA certificate
	caCert, err := ioutil.ReadFile("/path/to/ca.crt")
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatalf("failed to read CA cert: %v", err)
	}
	caCertPool := x509.NewCertPool()
	caCertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCert)

	// Setup TLS config
	tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
		RootCAs:      caCertPool,
		Certificates: loadClientCert(), // optional client cert
		MinVersion:   tls.VersionTLS12,
	}
	tlsConfig.BuildNameToCertificate()

	// Build secure connection string for Cockroachdb
	connString := "postgresql://:@:26257/?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/path/to/ca.crt&sslcert=/path/to/client.crt&sslkey=/path/to/client.key"

	pool, err := pgxpool.NewWithConfig(context.Background(), &pgxpool.Config{
		ConnString: connString,
		TLSConfig:  tlsConfig,
	})
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatalf("unable to connect to Cockroachdb: %v", err)
	}
	defer pool.Close()

	r := chi.NewRouter()
	r.Get("/users/{id}", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		id := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
		var name string
		row := pool.QueryRow(r.Context(), "SELECT name FROM users WHERE id = $1", id)
		if err := row.Scan(&name); err != nil {
			http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		w.Write([]byte(name))
	})

	http.ListenAndTLS(":8080", r, &tls.Config{
		MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
	})
}

func loadClientCert() []tls.Certificate {
	cert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair("/path/to/client.crt", "/path/to/client.key")
	if err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}
	return []tls.Certificate{cert}
}

For deployments using connection pools, ensure each pool instance enforces sslmode=verify-full and that environment variables are not overriding security settings. middleBrick’s CLI can be integrated into your workflow with middlebrick scan <url> to validate that runtime endpoints reflect these encryption settings. In CI/CD, the GitHub Action can fail builds if the scan detects sslmode=disable or missing certificate verification in the discovered API surface. The Pro plan’s continuous monitoring can alert you if a deployment later introduces a weaker configuration, and the MCP Server allows you to trigger scans directly from your AI coding assistant within Chi projects.