Insecure Direct Object Reference in Echo Go with Cockroachdb
Insecure Direct Object Reference in Echo Go with Cockroachdb — how this specific combination creates or exposes the vulnerability
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) occurs when an API exposes a reference to an internal object — such as a database row identifier — without sufficient authorization checks. In an Echo Go service using Cockroachdb, this typically arises when an endpoint accepts a user-supplied identifier (e.g., user_id or document_id) and directly queries Cockroachdb without verifying that the authenticated caller is permitted to access that specific object.
Consider an endpoint like /users/{user_id}. If the handler extracts user_id from the URL, passes it to a Cockroachdb query, and returns the record without confirming the requesting user owns or is allowed to view that user_id, the endpoint is vulnerable to IDOR. An attacker can simply change the numeric or UUID path parameter to access other users’ data. Because Cockroachdb preserves row-level identity and does not enforce application-level permissions, the database will return the requested row if the query is syntactically valid, even when the caller should be restricted.
When using an ORM or query builder with Cockroachdb in Echo Go, IDOR can also occur through indirect references. For example, if a handler resolves a team_id from a URL parameter and then fetches associated documents without checking that the authenticated user is a member of that team, the documents become exposed via tampered identifiers. The combination of Echo Go’s flexible routing and Cockroachdb’s strong consistency and SQL interface makes it straightforward to accidentally construct queries that reference objects by user-controlled keys without adequate ownership or scope checks.
In distributed systems where identifiers are often sequential integers or predictable UUIDs, IDOR is common because developers mistakenly assume that object references are unguessable. With Cockroachdb, the risk is amplified when queries use raw SQL strings or simplistic parameter bindings without scoping to the requester’s tenant or organization. For instance, a query like SELECT * FROM documents WHERE id = $1 bound to a user-supplied doc_id does not implicitly enforce that the document belongs to the caller’s workspace. Without additional filters in the WHERE clause, an attacker can iterate through IDs to harvest other tenants’ documents.
Because middleBrick scans unauthenticated attack surfaces, it can detect endpoints where path or query parameters directly map to database identifiers without authorization checks. Findings typically highlight missing ownership validation and suggest scoping queries to the authenticated subject’s accessible set of objects, which is essential when working with Cockroachdb in Echo Go to prevent IDOR.
Cockroachdb-Specific Remediation in Echo Go — concrete code fixes
To remediate IDOR in Echo Go with Cockroachdb, always scope database queries to the authenticated subject and enforce authorization before returning any row. Below are concrete, syntactically correct examples that demonstrate secure patterns.
1. Scoped query with authenticated subject
Assume you have an authenticated user ID available in the request context. Instead of querying by an arbitrary user_id from the URL, bind the authenticated subject and use it to scope the Cockroachdb query.
// Echo handler with scoped query
func getUserProfile(c echo.Context) error {
db := c.Get("db").(*sql.DB)
userID := c.Get("user").(*models.User).ID // authenticated subject from auth middleware
paramID, err := uuid.Parse(c.Param("user_id"))
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid user ID")
}
if paramID != userID {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
}
var profile UserProfile
// Cockroachdb query scoped to the authenticated user
err = db.QueryRow(context.Background(), "SELECT id, display_name, email FROM user_profiles WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2", paramID, userID).Scan(&profile.ID, &profile.DisplayName, &profile.Email)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotFound, "profile not found")
}
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "database error")
}
return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, profile)
}
2. Team-based scoping for associated resources
When accessing resources that belong to a team or tenant, verify membership before querying Cockroachdb.
// Secure document access with team membership check
func getDocument(c echo.Context) error {
db := c.Get("db").(*sql.DB)
userID := c.Get("user").(*models.User).ID
docID, err := uuid.Parse(c.Param("doc_id"))
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid document ID")
}
var doc Document
// Check team membership and fetch document in one query
err = db.QueryRow(context.Background(), `
SELECT d.id, d.title, d.content
FROM documents d
JOIN team_members tm ON d.team_id = tm.team_id
WHERE d.id = $1 AND tm.user_id = $2 AND tm.deleted_at IS NULL
`, docID, userID).Scan(&doc.ID, &doc.Title, &doc.Content)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "access denied or document not found")
}
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "database error")
}
return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, doc)
}
3. Use parameterized queries and avoid dynamic table/column names
Never interpolate identifiers directly into SQL strings. Use placeholders for values and strictly validate any schema object names against an allowlist.
// Safe query using placeholders; do not concatenate identifiers
func listTeamDocuments(c echo.Context) error {
db := c.Get("db").(*sql.DB)
userID := c.Get("user").(*models.User).ID
teamID, err := uuid.Parse(c.Param("team_id"))
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid team ID")
}
rows, err := db.Query(context.Background(), `
SELECT id, title FROM documents WHERE team_id = $1 AND owner_id = $2
`, teamID, userID)
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "database error")
}
defer rows.Close()
var results []DocumentSummary
for rows.Next() {
var d DocumentSummary
if err := rows.Scan(&d.ID, &d.Title); err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "scan error")
}
results = append(results, d)
}
return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, results)
}
4. Validate and normalize identifiers
Ensure that IDs parsed from URLs are canonical (e.g., UUIDs) and not subject to ambiguity. Reject malformed or suspicious values before they reach Cockroachdb.
// Validate UUID before using in Cockroachdb query
func normalizeID(input string) (uuid.UUID, error) {
id, err := uuid.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(input))
if err != nil {
return uuid.Nil, echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid identifier format")
}
return id, nil
}
By scoping queries to the authenticated user or tenant, validating identifiers, and avoiding direct exposure of raw database keys in URLs, you mitigate IDOR in Echo Go services backed by Cockroachdb. These practices align with OWASP API Top 10 and help ensure that object references cannot be traversed horizontally or vertically without proper authorization.
Related CWEs: bolaAuthorization
| CWE ID | Name | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-250 | Execution with Unnecessary Privileges | HIGH |
| CWE-639 | Insecure Direct Object Reference | CRITICAL |
| CWE-732 | Incorrect Permission Assignment | HIGH |