Identification Failures in Echo Go with Mongodb

An Identification Failure occurs when an API does not properly enforce identity checks across authorization boundaries, enabling one user to assume the identity of another. In the combination of Echo Go and MongoDB, this typically arises when route or query parameters are used directly as identifiers without verifying ownership or applying consistent access controls. Because Echo Go provides a flexible router and MongoDB allows rich querying, it is easy to construct endpoints where an objectID or filter supplied by the client is passed straight to the database without confirming that the authenticated subject is authorized to access that specific document.

For example, an endpoint like /users/:userID/profile might extract params.Get("userID") and use it to build a MongoDB filter bson.M{"_id": params.Get("userID")} without ensuring the requesting user matches that ID. If authentication is missing or bypassed, this becomes a direct BOLA/IDOR path: attackers can enumerate valid ObjectIDs or string identifiers and read or modify other users’ data. Identifiers that are predictable (e.g., sequential integers or non-URL-safe strings) compound the risk, as attackers can iterate through likely values quickly.

Within the 12 security checks run by middleBrick, this manifests strongly in the BOLA/IDOR and Property Authorization categories. The scanner tests whether an endpoint properly validates that the authenticated subject matches the provided identifier and whether property-level authorization is enforced before data is retrieved from MongoDB. Without such checks, sensitive fields such as email, role flags, or PII can be exposed. Because the scan operates against the unauthenticated attack surface, it can detect endpoints where identification is missing or insufficient even when the API appears to require a token.

Additional risk patterns include using a high-privilege MongoDB connection in the handler while trusting client-supplied filters. If the handler builds a query like bson.M{"_id": id, "tenantID": tenantID} but only binds id from the URL and fails to bind tenant context from the request (e.g., JWT claims), an attacker can access documents belonging to other tenants or administrative collections. This is a BOLA/IDOR issue specific to multi-tenant designs and should be flagged during the scan alongside input validation concerns around ObjectID parsing.

middleBrick’s OpenAPI/Swagger analysis helps surface these risks by examining path templates and required security schemes. When spec definitions do not align with runtime behavior—such as declaring authentication but not enforcing it on parameters used as MongoDB filters—the cross-reference highlights gaps. The scanner also checks for unauthenticated LLM endpoint exposure, which is orthogonal but relevant when AI tooling is used to generate handler code that inadvertently weakens identification logic.

To remediate Identification Failures in Echo Go with MongoDB, enforce strict ownership checks and avoid directly passing user input as database identifiers without validation. Always bind the authenticated subject (e.g., from JWT or session) and compare it against the document’s owning field before querying. Use parameterized filters and ensure the MongoDB connection operates with least privilege.

Secure handler pattern with ownership validation

Retrieve the authenticated subject from context, then construct a filter that includes both the user identifier and the target ID. This ensures users can only access their own documents even if they guess valid ObjectIDs.

// Assume claims contain subject identifier after JWT validation
type Claims struct {
    UserID string `json:"sub"`
}

func getUserProfile(c echo.Context) error {
    claims := c.Get("claims").(*Claims)
    userID := c.Param("userID")
    if userID == "" {
        return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, "userID is required")
    }
    // Ensure the requested userID matches the authenticated subject
    if userID != claims.UserID {
        return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "access denied")
    }
    var profile Profile
    filter := bson.M{
        "_id": userID,
        // If profiles are stored per-tenant, also include tenantID:
        // "tenantID": claims.TenantID,
    }
    err := collection.FindOne(c.Request().Context(), filter).Decode(&profile)
    if err != nil {
        if errors.Is(err, mongo.ErrNoDocuments) {
            return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotFound, "profile not found")
        }
        return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "unable to fetch profile")
    }
    return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, profile)
}

Using database references safely

If your application references other collections (for example, a roles collection), avoid resolving references solely based on user input. Instead, perform a server-side join or ensure the reference is validated against the authenticated subject.

func getTenantData(c echo.Context) error {
    claims := c.Get("claims").(*Claims)
    requestedTenant := c.Param("tenantID")
    // Do not trust client-supplied tenantID alone; bind it from JWT claims
    if requestedTenant != claims.TenantID {
        return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "invalid tenant")
    }
    var tenantData bson.M
    filter := bson.M{
        "_id":       requestedTenant,
        "deleted_at": nil,
    }
    err := tenantsCollection.FindOne(c.Request().Context(), filter).Decode(&tenantData)
    if err != nil {
        return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotFound, "tenant not found")
    }
    // Proceed with tenant-scoped operations
    return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, tenantData)
}

Input validation and ObjectID handling

Always validate identifiers before using them in MongoDB queries. Use MongoDB’s primitive validators or a library to ensure ObjectID strings are well-formed, and avoid string-to-ObjectID coercion that may silently accept malformed input.

import "go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson/primitive"

func validateAndParseObjectID(id string) (primitive.ObjectID, error) {
    if id == "" {
        return primitive.NilObjectID, errors.New("missing id")
    }
    objID, err := primitive.ObjectIDFromHex(id)
    if err != nil {
        return primitive.NilObjectID, echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid id format")
    }
    return objID, nil
}

func getDocumentByID(c echo.Context) error {
    objID, err := validateAndParseObjectID(c.Param("id"))
    if err != nil {
        return err
    }
    // Combine with subject validation for multi-tenant designs
    var doc Document
    filter := bson.M{
        "_id":     objID,
        "user_id": c.Get("claims").(*Claims).UserID,
    }
    err = collection.FindOne(c.Request().Context(), filter).Decode(&doc)
    if err != nil {
        if errors.Is(err, mongo.ErrNoDocuments) {
            return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotFound, "document not found")
        }
        return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "server error")
    }
    return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, doc)
}

Least-privilege MongoDB connection

Ensure the MongoDB client used by Echo Go does not have broader permissions than necessary. Configure roles to allow only the required read/write actions on the specific database and collections, avoiding powerful cluster-wide privileges in handlers.

middleBrick integration

Use the CLI to validate that these patterns are reflected in your runtime behavior: middlebrick scan <url>. The scan will surface BOLA/IDOR and Property Authorization findings when identification controls are weak, and the Web Dashboard can help you track improvements over time. For CI/CD enforcement, add the GitHub Action to fail builds if risk scores drop below your chosen threshold, and consider the Pro plan for continuous monitoring across many endpoints.