Identification Failures in Adonisjs with Api Keys

Identification failures occur when an API cannot correctly determine and enforce the identity of the caller. In AdonisJS, combining weak identification practices with an API keys mechanism can expose endpoints to BOLA/IDOR and unauthorized privilege use. Unlike session-based authentication where a cookie ties a request to a verified user, API keys are typically bearer tokens that, if not handled with strict identification checks, allow any holder to act as any other holder or escalate access.

An AdonisJS project often manages API keys via a database model (e.g., ApiKey) and a provider that resolves the key on each request. A common misconfiguration is to look up the key but skip verifying scope, tenant, or user context before routing the request. For example, if an endpoint like /api/users/:id only checks that a key is valid but does not confirm that the key’s associated user or tenant matches the :id in the URL, an attacker can iterate through numeric IDs and read or modify other users’ data. This is an Identification Failure because the system fails to assert that the caller identified by the key is the same subject authorized for the target resource.

Another scenario specific to AdonisJS is the misuse of global hooks where API keys are validated once, but subsequent route handlers do not reassert identification for each sensitive action. If a key is accepted in an auth middleware and the controller directly uses request parameters (e.g., params.get('id')) without cross-checking ownership, the unauthenticated attack surface expands. The scanner’s BOLA/IDOR checks will flag this as a finding because the endpoint trusts the key but does not enforce proper identification checks against the resource identifier.

AdonisJS ecosystems that integrate third-party packages or custom guards can inadvertently weaken identification when keys are passed through multiple layers. For instance, a service that fetches a key from a header and attaches it to the auth context must propagate the correct user identity; otherwise, two different services sharing the same key might be treated as the same principal. This breaks the one-to-one mapping between key and identity, leading to confused deputy patterns where one service’s identification failure affects another. The LLM/AI Security checks in middleBrick can additionally detect exposed system prompts or prompt injection attempts if an AI-assisted code generation tool suggests insecure patterns for key handling in AdonisJS.

Real-world attack patterns mirror these risks. Consider an AdonisJS API that exposes GET /api/projects/:projectId. If the route relies on a key-only check and does not verify that the key’s owner has access to projectId, an attacker can use a valid key from one project to enumerate or manipulate another project’s data. This aligns with OWASP API Top 10 A01:2023 broken object level authorization. The scanner’s BOLA/IDOR category will surface such misconfigurations, providing severity and remediation guidance to tighten identification logic.

To summarize, Identification Failures in AdonisJS with API keys arise when key validation does not tightly bind the caller’s identity to the requested resource. This creates paths for horizontal privilege escalation, data exposure, and confused deputy scenarios. The scanner’s 12 parallel checks, including BOLA/IDOR and Property Authorization, are designed to surface these gaps by correlating spec definitions with runtime behavior, ensuring that identification is enforced consistently across endpoints.

Remediation focuses on ensuring that every request using an API key explicitly validates not only the key’s validity but also its association with the requested resource. In AdonisJS, this means extending your auth provider or middleware to perform ownership and scope checks before allowing access.

First, structure your API key model to include references to the authorized user or tenant. For example:

// app/Models/ApiKey.ts
import { DateTime } from 'luxon'
import { BaseModel, column, belongsTo } from '@ioc:Adonis/Lucid/Orm'
import User from './User'

export default class ApiKey extends BaseModel {
  @column({ isPrimary: true })
  public id: number

  @column()
  public key: string

  @column()
  public userId: number

  @belongsTo(() => User)
  public user: BelongsTo

  @column.dateTime({ autoCreate: true })
  public createdAt: DateTime

  @column.dateTime({ autoCreate: true, autoUpdate: true })
  public updatedAt:DateTime
}

Next, in your authentication provider or middleware, after locating the key, assert that the key’s user matches the resource being accessed. For a route like GET /api/users/:id, ensure the key’s user ID equals the user ID derived from the :id parameter or from a related ownership model:

// start/hooks.ts or a route-level middleware
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'
import ApiKey from 'App/Models/ApiKey'

export async function ensureKeyOwnsUser({ params, auth }: HttpContextContract) {
  const key = await auth.authenticate('api_key')
  // Assuming you attach user to the auth context
  const user = key.user
  if (!user) {
    throw new Error('Invalid key context')
  }
  // Example for a user-specific endpoint
  if (params.id && String(user.id) !== params.id) {
    throw new Error('Forbidden: key does not own this resource')
  }
}

For endpoints that involve other resources such as projects or organizations, include tenant or group checks. If an API key is scoped to a tenant, verify that the target resource belongs to the same tenant:

// app/Models/Project.ts
import { DateTime } from 'luxon'
import { BaseModel, column, belongsTo } from '@ioc:Adonis/Lucid/Orm'
import Tenant from './Tenant'

export default class Project extends BaseModel {
  @column({ isPrimary: true })
  public id: number

  @column()
  public tenantId: number

  @belongsTo(() => Tenant)
  public tenant: BelongsTo
}

// middleware or controller check
const project = await Project.findOrFail(params.id)
if (project.tenantId !== key.tenantId) {
  throw new Error('Forbidden: cross-tenant access')
}

When using the middleBrick CLI (middlebrick scan <url>) or the GitHub Action to integrate API security checks into your CI/CD pipeline, you can enforce that these identification checks are present and correctly implemented. The scanner’s findings will highlight missing associations between keys and resources, guiding you to add the necessary guards.

Additionally, for environments that use the middleBrick MCP Server to scan APIs directly from AI coding assistants, be cautious of suggestions that omit ownership validation. The assistant might propose key-based auth without explicit resource mapping; always augment such proposals with the checks shown above. On the Web Dashboard, track these fixes over time and, if needed, upgrade to the Pro plan for continuous monitoring and alerts that notify you when a new scan reveals regressions in identification logic.