Identification Failures in Actix with Cockroachdb

Identification failures occur when an API incorrectly identifies or infers a user’s identity, enabling one user to act as another. In Actix web services that use CockroachDB as the backend, this typically arises from a mismatch between how actors are authenticated in the application layer and how ownership or permissions are verified at the database level.

Actix web applications often rely on session tokens, JWTs, or custom identity claims to represent a user. If the API resolves an actor ID (e.g., user_id) from an authentication token and then uses that ID directly in CockroachDB queries without additional verification, a BOLA/IDOR pattern emerges. For example, an attacker who can tamper with a JWT subject or reuse a captured session token may change the user_id in the request and thereby access another user’s records stored in CockroachDB.

Because CockroachDB is a distributed SQL database, it enforces SQL-level constraints and isolation, but it does not inherently understand application-level authorization. If the Actix service issues queries like SELECT * FROM profiles WHERE user_id = $1 with a user-supplied ID, the database will faithfully return rows if they exist—even if the calling user should not have access. This is an identification failure: the API trusts the provided identifier instead of re-deriving or cross-checking identity from the authenticated session context.

Moreover, when APIs expose endpoints that include resource identifiers in URLs or request bodies (e.g., /users/{user_id}/settings), and those identifiers are used to construct CockroachDB queries without validating that the authenticated principal owns that identifier, the attack surface grows. An attacker can probe numeric or UUID identifiers sequentially or enumerate patterns, leveraging the database’s fast, consistent responses to confirm existence and permissions. The combination of Actix’s async request handling and CockroachDB’s strong consistency can make these enumeration attacks more efficient, as queries return predictable results without introducing latency that might otherwise slow down an attacker.

Compounding the risk, if the Actix application reuses database connections or prepared statements across requests without properly scoping tenant or user context, a misconfiguration might lead to leaking identity context between requests. Although CockroachDB provides strong transactional guarantees, it does not automatically segregate rows per request; the application must ensure that each query includes the correct tenant or user context derived from the authenticated session, not from untrusted input. Failure to do so is a classic identification failure that maps directly to OWASP API Top 10 IDOR and BOLA categories, and it is precisely the gap that middleBrick’s BOLA/IDOR and Authentication checks are designed to surface.

Remediation focuses on ensuring that the authenticated identity is the single source of truth and that every CockroachDB query enforces ownership or authorization rather than trusting client-supplied identifiers. Below are concrete patterns and code examples for Actix with CockroachDB.

1. Derive identity from the session, not the URL

After authentication, store the user’s unique subject (e.g., a UUID or stable user identifier) in the session or JWT claims. Use that identity to scope every database query, and avoid allowing the client to dictate resource identifiers that map directly to database keys.

use actix_web::{web, HttpResponse, Result};
use crate::db::get_pool; // pool for CockroachDB
use crate::auth::Identity;

async fn get_user_settings(identity: web::ReqIdentity) -> Result {
    let user_id = identity.user_id(); // derived from auth/session, not from URL
    let pool = get_pool().ok_or_else(|| HttpResponse::InternalServerError().finish())?;
    let row = pool
        .fetch_one(
            "SELECT settings_json FROM user_settings WHERE user_id = $1",
            &[&user_id],
        )
        .await;
    match row {
        Ok(rec) => Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(rec.get::("settings_json"))),
        Err(_) => Ok(HttpResponse::NotFound().finish()),
    }
}

2. Use parameterized queries with ownership checks

Never build SQL by concatenating identifiers. Use parameterized queries and include the authenticated user as a filter, even if the identifier arrives from the client. This ensures that permissions are re-verified at the database level.

async fn update_profile(
    web::Path(input): web::Path,
    identity: web::ReqIdentity,
) -> Result {
    let user_id = identity.user_id();
    let pool = get_pool().ok_or_else(|| HttpResponse::InternalServerError().finish())?;
    let updated = pool
        .execute(
            "UPDATE profiles SET display_name = $1 WHERE user_id = $2 AND user_id = $3",
            &[&input.display_name, &user_id, &user_id],
        )
        .await;
    match updated {
        Ok(1) => Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().finish()),
        _ => Ok(HttpResponse::NotFound().finish()),
    }
}

3. Enforce tenant or organization scoping

For multi-tenant deployments, include a tenant_id derived from the authenticated session in every CockroachDB WHERE clause. Do not rely on the client-provided tenant identifier alone.

async fn list_invoices(
    web::Query(params): web::Query,
    identity: web::ReqIdentity,
) -> Result {
    let user_id = identity.user_id();
    let tenant_id = identity.tenant_id();
    let pool = get_pool().ok_or_else(|| HttpResponse::InternalServerError().finish())?;
    let invoices = pool
        .query(
            "SELECT id, amount FROM invoices WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND owner_id = $2 ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT $3",
            &[&tenant_id, &user_id, ¶ms.limit],
        )
        .await;
    // handle and return results
}

4. Validate and sanitize inputs even when identity is trusted

While identity should come from the session, you should still validate any additional inputs (e.g., UUID formats, enum values) before using them in queries to avoid injection or malformed queries that could expose metadata.

async fn get_resource(
    path: web::Path<(Uuid, Uuid)>, // (tenant_id, resource_id) — still validated server-side
    identity: web::ReqIdentity,
) -> Result {
    let (tenant_id, resource_id) = path.into_inner();
    let user_id = identity.user_id();
    // server-side verification that this resource belongs to the user/tenant
    let pool = get_pool().ok_or_else(|| HttpResponse::InternalServerError().finish())?;
    let row = pool
        .query_opt(
            "SELECT id FROM resources WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2 AND owner_id = $3",
            &[&resource_id, &tenant_id, &user_id],
        )
        .await;
    match row {
        Ok(Some(_)) => Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json("ok")),
        _ => Ok(HttpResponse::Forbidden().finish()),
    }
}

These patterns ensure that identification in Actix backed by CockroachDB is grounded in the authenticated session and enforced at query time, reducing the likelihood of BOLA/IDOR and other identification failures.