Injection Flaws in Cockroachdb

Injection flaws in Cockroachdb applications occur when user-supplied data is concatenated directly into SQL queries without proper sanitization. Cockroachdb's PostgreSQL compatibility means it shares the same injection vulnerabilities as PostgreSQL, but with some database-specific nuances.

The most common pattern involves string concatenation in Go applications using the github.com/cockroachdb/cockroach-go/crdb package. Consider this vulnerable code:

func getBalance(db *sql.DB, userID string) (float64, error) {
  query := fmt.Sprintf("SELECT balance FROM accounts WHERE user_id = '%s'", userID)
  row := db.QueryRow(query)
  var balance float64
  err := row.Scan(&balance)
  return balance, err
}

An attacker could supply userID = "' OR '1'='1" to bypass authentication or extract all account balances.

Cockroachdb's distributed architecture introduces additional injection vectors. The crdb package's transaction handling can be exploited when dynamic SQL is used within transactions:

func transferFunds(db *sql.DB, from, to string, amount float64) error {
  return crdb.ExecuteTx(context.Background(), db, nil, func(tx *sql.Tx) error {
    // Vulnerable: dynamic SQL in transaction
    query := fmt.Sprintf("UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - %f WHERE user_id = '%s'", amount, from)
    if _, err := tx.Exec(query); err != nil { return err }
    
    // Simulated failure point for TOCTOU attacks
    query = fmt.Sprintf("UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance + %f WHERE user_id = '%s'", amount, to)
    return tx.Exec(query)
  })
}

Time-based SQL injection is particularly effective in Cockroachdb due to its pg_sleep() function compatibility. An attacker could use:

SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' OR pg_sleep(10)='

This causes a 10-second delay if the first character of a password hash matches, enabling blind extraction of sensitive data.

Schema manipulation through injection is another Cockroachdb-specific concern. The information_schema tables can be queried to discover database structure:

SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema = 'public' AND table_name LIKE '%user%'

Without proper input validation, this can reveal table names, column structures, and data relationships across the distributed cluster.

Detecting injection flaws in Cockroachdb applications requires both static analysis and runtime scanning. middleBrick's black-box scanning approach is particularly effective for Cockroachdb APIs because it tests the actual attack surface without requiring source code access.

The scanner identifies Cockroachdb-specific injection patterns by sending payloads that exploit PostgreSQL compatibility while accounting for Cockroachdb's distributed query execution. For example, it tests:

-- Boolean-based injection
admin' OR (SELECT 1 FROM accounts LIMIT 1)=1--

middleBrick's LLM/AI security module also detects when Cockroachdb connection strings or query results are exposed through AI interfaces, which could reveal database structure or credentials.

Runtime detection involves monitoring query patterns. Cockroachdb's crdb_internal schema provides insights into query execution:

SELECT query, execution_count, rows_returned
FROM crdb_internal.cluster_queries
WHERE query LIKE '%OR%' OR query LIKE '%UNION%'
ORDER BY execution_count DESC;

This identifies suspicious query patterns that might indicate injection attempts. The crdb_internal.node_queries view shows distributed execution patterns that could reveal timing-based injection attacks across the cluster.

middleBrick's OpenAPI analysis cross-references API endpoints with their expected parameter types. When a string parameter that should be an integer is detected, it automatically tests for numeric SQL injection:

-- Numeric injection in Cockroachdb
SELECT * FROM orders WHERE order_id = 1 OR 1=1

The scanner also tests for Cockroachdb-specific functions like crdb_internal.node_id exposure through injection, which could reveal cluster topology information.

Remediating injection flaws in Cockroachdb applications requires a defense-in-depth approach using the database's native security features. The primary defense is parameterized queries using Cockroachdb's crdb package prepared statements:

func getBalanceSecure(db *sql.DB, userID string) (float64, error) {
  query := "SELECT balance FROM accounts WHERE user_id = $1"
  row := db.QueryRow(query, userID)
  var balance float64
  return balance, row.Scan(&balance)
}

For complex queries, Cockroachdb's crdb package supports named parameters:

query := "SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $email AND status = $status"
rows, err := db.Query(query, sql.Named("email", email), sql.Named("status", "active"))

Cockroachdb's role-based access control (RBAC) limits injection impact by restricting what queries can be executed. Create least-privilege roles:

-- Restrict user to specific tables only
CREATE ROLE app_user;
GRANT SELECT, UPDATE ON accounts TO app_user;
GRANT SELECT ON users TO app_user;

For applications using ORMs with Cockroachdb, ensure the ORM properly escapes identifiers. GORM's Clause API provides safe query building:

db.Clauses(clause.Where{Expr: "user_id = ?", Args: []interface{}{userID}}).Find(&results)

Cockroachdb's pg_catalog schema can be restricted to prevent information disclosure through injection:

REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA pg_catalog FROM public;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA pg_catalog TO admin_role;

Input validation at the application layer should match Cockroachdb's data types. For numeric fields, validate before query construction:

func validateIntParam(param string) (int, error) {
  if num, err := strconv.Atoi(param); err == nil {
    return num, nil
  }
  return 0, errors.New("invalid integer parameter")
}

Cockroachdb's ALTER ROLE statement can disable dangerous functions for application roles:

ALTER ROLE app_user SET password_encryption = 'scram-sha-256';
REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION pg_sleep(time) FROM app_user;

For time-based attacks, Cockroachdb's SET statement_timeout limits query execution time:

SET statement_timeout = '5s'; -- 5 second timeout for all queries