Credential Stuffing in Strapi with Cockroachdb

Credential stuffing takes advantage of reused passwords across services. Strapi, as an authentication layer, can be targeted when session management or credential verification logic does not adequately protect against high-volume, low-identity-authentication attempts. When Strapi is backed by Cockroachdb as the data store, the interaction between the application’s user model and the database can expose patterns that make automated credential testing feasible.

In a typical Strapi setup, user records are stored in a Cockroachdb table (e.g., users) with fields such as email, password_hash, and possibly custom fields like role or last_login. If rate limiting is not enforced at the authentication endpoint (e.g., /auth/local), an attacker can submit many email/password combinations in rapid succession. Even though passwords are hashed, the volume of requests can reveal whether a given email exists in the Cockroachdb table based on timing differences or error message consistency, especially if responses are not uniformly handled.

Strapi’s default behavior may expose whether an account exists through subtle differences in HTTP status codes or response messages. For example, a 200 with a session token versus a 400 with “Invalid credentials” can indicate a valid email. When combined with automated tooling, this becomes a vector for credential stuffing. Cockroachdb’s strong consistency and distributed nature do not mitigate application-level logic issues; if Strapi does not enforce uniform response handling and rate limiting, the database backend does not prevent the attack.

Additionally, if session tokens or JWTs are not rotated or invalidated properly after login, compromised credentials can be reused across sessions. Cockroachdb may store token metadata (e.g., in a auth_sessions table), but if the application does not validate token revocation or enforce short lifetimes, stolen tokens remain usable. Attackers can run credential lists against the authentication endpoint, leveraging these weaknesses to gain unauthorized access to user accounts that share passwords across services.

From a compliance and discovery perspective, scans such as those provided by middleBrick evaluate whether authentication endpoints exhibit signs of susceptibility to credential stuffing. The tool checks for missing rate limiting, inconsistent error handling, and weak session management practices, reporting findings mapped to frameworks like OWASP API Top 10. By identifying these issues early, teams can adjust Strapi middleware and Cockroachdb-backed logic to reduce risk.

To reduce credential stuffing risk, Strapi code should enforce strict rate limits on authentication endpoints and ensure responses do not leak account existence information. Below are specific, syntactically correct Cockroachdb-related examples for Strapi that address these concerns.

1. Configure consistent authentication responses

Ensure Strapi returns the same HTTP status and generic message regardless of whether the email exists. This removes timing and message-based signals that attackers exploit.

// src/api/auth/controllers/Auth.js
'use strict';

module.exports = {
  async callback(ctx) {
    const { email, password } = ctx.request.body;

    // Always perform a lookup to avoid timing attacks
    const user = await strapi.entityService.findOne('api::user.user',
      { filter: { email } },
      { fields: ['id', 'password_hash', 'role'] }
    );

    // Simulate password check even if user not found to prevent timing leaks
    const isValid = user && await strapi.plugins['users-permissions'].service('users').validatePassword(password, user?.password_hash);

    // Uniform response
    if (!isValid) {
      ctx.status = 401;
      ctx.body = { error: 'Invalid credentials' };
      return;
    }

    // Issue token or session
    const token = strapi.plugins['users-permissions'].services.jwt.issue({ id: user.id });
    ctx.body = { token };
  },
};

2. Enforce rate limiting via middleware with Cockroachdb tracking

Use a rate-limiting strategy that stores attempt counts in Cockroachdb, keyed by IP or email, to prevent brute-force attempts across distributed nodes.

// src/middlewares/rate-limit-auth/index.js
'use strict';

const { DateTime } = require('luxon');

module.exports = (config, { strapi }) => {
  return async function rateLimitAuth(ctx, next) {
    const email = ctx.request.body?.email;
    const ip = ctx.ip;
    const now = DateTime.utc().toISO();

    if (!email) {
      return next();
    }

    const client = strapi.db.connection; // Cockroachdb client from Strapi's ORM
    const key = `auth_attempt:${email}`;

    // Use an upsert to either insert or increment attempt count with reset timestamp
    const query = `
      INSERT INTO auth_attempts (identifier, attempts, expires_at)
      VALUES ($1, 1, $2)
      ON CONFLICT (identifier) DO UPDATE
        SET attempts = auth_attempts.attempts + 1, expires_at = $2
      RETURNING attempts, expires_at;
    `;
    const { rows } = await client.query(query, [key, DateTime.utc().plus({ minutes: 15 }).toISO()]);
    const { attempts, expires_at } = rows[0];

    if (attempts > 10) {
      ctx.status = 429;
      ctx.body = { error: 'Too many attempts, try again later' };
      return;
    }

    await next();
  };
};

In Cockroachdb, ensure the table exists with a schema suitable for high-write workloads:

CREATE TABLE auth_attempts (
  identifier STRING PRIMARY KEY,
  attempts INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
  expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL
);

-- Create an index to efficiently expire old rows
CREATE INDEX idx_auth_attempts_expires ON auth_attempts (expires_at);

3. Rotate tokens and validate sessions

After login, issue short-lived JWTs and store session metadata in Cockroachdb to support revocation checks.

// Example token creation and storage after successful auth
const sessionId = strapi.db.connection.escapeId ? strapi.db.connection.escapeId(`sess_${Date.now()}`) : `sess_${Date.now()}`;
const insertSessionQuery = `
  INSERT INTO auth_sessions (id, user_id, token_hash, expires_at)
  VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4);
`;
await strapi.db.connection.query(insertSessionQuery, [
  sessionId,
  user.id,
  await strapi.plugins['users-permissions'].service('hash').argon2(password + user.salt),
  DateTime.utc().plus({ hours: 1 }).toISO(),
]);

// On each request, validate session against Cockroachdb
const validateSessionQuery = `SELECT revoked FROM auth_sessions WHERE id = $1 AND expires_at > $2;`;
const { rows } = await strapi.db.connection.query(validateSessionQuery, [sessionId, DateTime.utc().toISO()]);
if (!rows[0] || rows[0].revoked) {
  ctx.status = 401;
  ctx.body = { error: 'Invalid session' };
  return;
}

These concrete changes — uniform responses, Cockroachdb-backed rate limiting, and session token management — reduce the attack surface for credential stuffing against Strapi deployments while leveraging Cockroachdb’s consistency and scalability.