Arp Spoofing in Adonisjs with Postgresql

Arp spoofing is a Layer 2 attack where an adversary sends falsified Address Resolution Protocol messages to associate their MAC address with the IP of a legitimate host, such as your database server. In a typical Adonisjs application using Postgresql, the web server runs Node.js and communicates with Postgresql over TCP; this normally occurs over routed Layer 3 networks where ARP is less of a concern on hardened hosts. However, if an attacker is on the same Layer 2 broadcast domain (for example, a shared VLAN, an open WiFi segment, or a compromised host within the same container/pod network), they can perform ARP spoofing to intercept traffic intended for the Postgresql server.

With Adonisjs, this exposure becomes relevant when connections are not strictly isolated or encrypted in transit. An attacker who successfully spoofs the Postgresql server’s ARP cache on the Adonisjs host can redirect database traffic through their machine. Since Adonisjs often relies on connection pools and persistent client connections to Postgresql, an active network attacker may capture or manipulate unencrypted credentials, query payloads, or result sets if TLS is not enforced. The risk is higher in development or flat network environments where encryption in transit may be disabled for convenience, and where ARP inspection or host isolation is not enforced.

The attack does not exploit Adonisjs application code directly but leverages the network path between the Adonisjs runtime and Postgresql. If the Adonisjs app uses raw query strings or ORM methods that conditionally build SQL without strict input validation, intercepted traffic is not the primary target; rather, the goal is credential theft or session manipulation via ARP-based interception. This underscores the importance of enforcing encrypted connections, network segmentation, and host-level network security controls to mitigate ARP spoofing regardless of the framework or database in use.

Remediation focuses on ensuring all communication between Adonisjs and Postgresql is encrypted and that host identity is verified, reducing the impact of ARP spoofing. You should enforce SSL/TLS for Postgresql connections and avoid trusting ARP-derived mappings for security decisions.

1. Enforce SSL/TLS in Adonisjs Postgresql configuration. In config/database.ts, set ssl: { rejectUnauthorized: true } and ensure your client certificates and CA bundle are properly provisioned. This prevents credential and data exposure even if an attacker intercepts traffic via ARP spoofing.

import { DatabaseConfig } from '@ioc:Adonis/Lucid/Database';

const dbConfig: DatabaseConfig = {
  connection: 'pg',
  connections: {
    pg: {
      client: 'postgresql',
      version: '14',
      host: process.env.DB_HOST,
      port: 5432,
      user: process.env.DB_USER,
      password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD,
      database: process.env.DB_NAME,
      ssl: {
        rejectUnauthorized: true,
        ca: process.env.POSTGRES_SSL_CA,
        key: process.env.POSTGRES_SSL_KEY,
        cert: process.env.POSTGRES_SSL_CERT,
      },
    },
  },
};

export default dbConfig;

2. Use environment variables for sensitive values and avoid hardcoding connection details that could be exposed in logs or source control. Rotate credentials regularly and prefer IAM-based or certificate-based authentication where supported by your Postgresql provider.

3. Apply network-level protections: isolate the database subnet, use security groups or firewall rules to restrict source IPs, and enable host-based authentication (e.g., pg_hba.conf) to limit which systems can connect. While these are not Adonisjs code changes, they complement application-side settings.

4. Validate and sanitize all inputs that contribute to SQL construction, even though ARP spoofing does not directly alter queries. Use parameterized queries via Lucid ORM or raw parameterized queries to avoid injection, which remains a critical concern regardless of network-layer attacks.

Example of a safe parameterized query in Adonisjs:

import User from 'App/Models/User'
import Database from '@ioc:Adonis/Lucid/Database'

// Safe parameterized raw query
const results = await Database.query()
  .select('id', 'email')
  .from('users')
  .where('id', '=', userId)

// Using Lucid ORM with where clauses (parameterized under the hood)
const user = await User.findByOrFail('email', email)

5. For Postgresql, ensure the server enforces SSL and strong cipher suites. On the database side, require sslmode=verify-ca or verify-full for connections and validate client certificates. This ensures that even if ARP spoofing occurs, the attacker cannot decrypt or inject without valid certificates.